The Meno is traditionally a transitional dialogue. It shares features of the both the early and the middle dialogues.
I talk about his view of God. It has important ramifications. It occurs in a dialogue that Plato wrote called the Phaedo. They are divided into three groups. Now here are some of the differences among these writings.
In the early writings of Plato, the central figure is usually Socrates, and there is often little of great philosophical significance in the early dialogues. In another early dialogue, you have Socrates waiting in jail to be executed.
But in the Phaedo, you have what is supposed to be the last meeting between Socrates and his disciples before he is executed by drinking hemlock. Because this is a middle dialogue, the Phaedo, scholars believe that by this time in his life Plato was taking liberties with the historical Socrates and was actually using Socrates as a spokesman for his own ideas.
One reason why we know that some of the material is not historically accurate is because Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates his very important theory of the forms. The dialogue assumes this form very quickly. Socrates is asked to prove the immortality of the soul. In response to that question, Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates a number of arguments that he apparently thinks prove the immortality of the soul when in fact the arguments are quite, quite bad.
Now, what we mean by equality here is the fact that two line segments might have the same length, or two triangles might have the same size—that kind of equality.
And Socrates asks his friends: What must you know in order for you to know that two things are equal—like two line segments, two sticks, two triangles—what must you know before you know that two things are equal?
Well, first of all, you have to have information about the size of this line segment, you have to have information about the size of these triangles.
And how do you acquire that information? Through your sense organs. You see, you touch, you evaluate. But you must know something else before you can know that two things are equal. You have to know what the concept of equality is. You cannot know that two things are equal unless you first know what equality is.
Then Socrates says you cannot know the concept of equality through your senses because everything that you perceive through your senses is changeable, is non-eternal, is non immutable.Plato and Aristotle UC Davis Philosophy Theory of Knowledge Fall, Having shown that perception is not sufficient for knowledge, Socrates attacks the analysis from the other direction, arguing that it is not necessary either.
Plato's theory of recollection won few adherents in Western epistemology. It seems very much that.
, Plato's theory of knowledge: the Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato / translated with a running commentary by F.M. Cornford Routledge & K. Paul London Wikipedia Citation Please see Wikipedia's template documentation for further citation fields that may be caninariojana.com://caninariojana.com Plato's epistemology holds that knowledge of Platonic Ideas is innate, so that learning is the development of ideas buried deep in the soul, often under the midwife-like guidance of an interrogator.
In several dialogues by Plato, the character Socrates presents the view that each soul existed before birth with the Form of the Good and a perfect knowledge .
Plato's objection to this proposal (b) is that it leaves open the possibility that someone could count as having knowledge of the name “Theaetetus” even if they could do no more than write out the letters of the name “Theaetetus” in the right caninariojana.com://caninariojana.com In Posterior Analytics , Aristotle argues that we cannot have innate knowledge of first principles because if we did we would have the most precise items of knowledge caninariojana.com?q=articles/.
The limitations of the inquiry are the limitations of the main inquirers, and neither (the historical) Socrates nor Theaetetus was a card-carrying adherent of Plato's theory of Forms. Perhaps the dialogue brings us only as far as the threshold of the theory of Forms precisely because, on Socratic principles, one can get no further.